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"Globalisation" means different things to different people. To Charles Pasqua, a senior
French politician, it is "the new totalitarianism of our time".
1 To Anthony Giddens, a
distinguished sociologist, it is an anthropologist in rural Africa, hoping for insights into
traditional life-styles when she goes to a local home, only to be invited to join in watching
Basic Instinct on video.
2 To street protestors, it is a catch-all term for everything unpleasant
that distinguishes the twenty-first century from its predecessors.
Even in economics, "globalisation" has many interpretations, ranging from the design
of international economic institutions to the economics of the internet.
3 In this paper, I want
to concentrate on what is probably its core meaning: the increased interdependence of national
economies, and the trend towards greater integration of goods and factor markets. My focus
is methodological: how should we approach the study of globalisation? My answer is
twofold: we will usually want to work with general equilibrium models; and we will often
want to work with imperfectly competitive models, so we need to pay careful attention to
issues of market structure.
The need for general equilibrium models is not so controversial, though I should
explain what I mean by the term. This is not general equilibrium in the style of Arrow and
Debreu. If we want to answer real-world questions, we have to trade off generality for
tractability. Hence the distinguishing feature of the models I have in mind is not their
generality per se. With special functional forms and a host of simplifying assumptions, they
are anything but general relative to many partial equilibrium models. Rather, their
1 "La mondialisation ... nouveau totalitarianisme de notre temps", Le Monde, 5 December
1999.
2 Giddens (1999).
3 For discussions of some of the policy aspects of globalisation, see Rodrik (1997) and Stiglitz
(2002).distinguishing feature is a focus on interactions between markets: between home and foreign
markets, to be sure, but especially between goods and factor markets. For example, one of
the central economic puzzles posed by globalisation is whether changes in trade or technology
are primarily responsible for the increased income inequality in Western economies, and
especially for the worsening economic position of unskilled relative to skilled workers. It is
surely obvious that addressing this problem requires an approach which is general equilibrium
in my sense.
Market structure is another matter. Existing models, assuming either perfect or
monopolistic competition, have thrown considerable light on the problems of globalisation.
Of course, the assumptions which both variants of competition share are patently unrealistic
for most markets: an infinitely elastic supply of atomistic firms that face no barriers to entry
or exit and that do not engage in strategic behaviour. But unrealistic assumptions are not in
themselves grounds for rejecting a theory. I need to show that alternative models are at least
as realistic and generate more plausible predictions. My argument here is twofold. In the
first place, competitive models have almost nothing to say about the impact of globalisation
on market structure itself. An example is the phenomenon of merger waves, especially cross-
border ones, such as occurred in the European Union with the completion of the Single
Market. In the second place, prices are the only channel through which changes in market
conditions impinge on domestic firms in competitive models. Allowing for oligopolistic
interaction suggests many other ways in which globalisation can affect domestic markets.
To address these issues, I first take a more detailed look at competitive approaches to
globalisation and especially to the trade and wages debate in Section 2. I then turn in
Sections 3 and 4 to consider the reasons why there is to date no satisfactory theory of
oligopoly in general equilibrium. I review the problems which have held back the
2development of such a theory, and propose an approach which overcomes them. Only after
these preliminaries can I explore the implications of my approach for some of the economic
aspects of globalisation: the effects of trade liberalisation on specialisation patterns, on cross-
border merger waves, and on wage inequality.
2. Competitive General Equilibrium and its Discontents
At first blush, perfectly competitive general equilibrium in the form of the textbook
Stolper-Samuelson theorem seems to give a plausible and parsimonious explanation of recent
changes in income distribution. If globalisation means a fall in the relative price of unskilled-
labour-intensive imports into the developed countries of the "North", then the theorem predicts
that it must lower the wages of unskilled relative to skilled workers there. Of course, there
is much more to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem than this. As extended to higher-dimensional
competitive models by Ethier (1974) and Jones and Scheinkman (1977), it implies an
important lesson for globalisation: almost any exogenous change yields both winners and
losers, in the sense that at least one factor will always gain and at least one other always lose
in real terms. So market forces cannot be relied upon to deliver Pareto-improving changes.
However, in its original setting of two factors and two sectors, the theorem is overwhelmingly
rejected by the evidence. For one thing, it predicts that the rise in skilled wages should
encourage a fall in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour used in all sectors. For another,
when run in reverse it implies that the higher export prices enjoyed by the less developed
countries of the "South" should increase relative unskilled wages there. Neither prediction
accords with the empirical evidence.
4 To paraphrase Robbins (1996), "Stolper-Samuelson
hits facts: Facts win".
4 See Desjonqueres, Machin and van Reenan (1999) and Haskel (1999).
3These problems can be overcome without abandoning perfect competition by allowing
for multi-stage production. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Jones (2002) have shown that
price changes may encourage Northern firms to fragment, relocating or out-sourcing to the
South those stages of production which are relatively unskilled-labour-intensive in the North
but relatively skilled-labour-intensive in the South. As a result, the relative demand for
skilled labour increases, raising skill intensities as well as skill premia, in both exporting and
importing countries. This approach resolves one set of puzzles. However, like the Stolper-
Samuelson approach, it is vulnerable to a critique of Krugman (1995): import prices and trade
volumes have not changed enough to explain the large changes in income distribution which
have taken place. This is especially true of North-South trade. Imports from developing
countries still constitute a small proportion of total EU and U.S. imports, which in turn are
small relative to GNP.
The failure to provide a fully satisfactory trade-based explanation for changes in wage
inequality might simply mean that trade is not the culprit. That leaves changes in technology
as the residual claimant to explanatory power, and there is no shortage of technology-based
explanations of changes in relative wages, whether movements along the technological
frontier, such as changes arising from capital-skill complementarity (Krusell et al. (2000)),
or outward shifts of it, such as computerisation (Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998)) or, more
generally, changes in general-purpose technologies (Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa
(1999)). But just as it would be foolish to deny the importance of the huge changes in
technology in recent decades, it is surely premature to argue that globalisation has had nothing
to do with rising wage inequality. Moreover, once we leave the perfectly competitive
paradigm, a number of alternative ways in which trade can affect domestic labour markets
are suggested.
4First, trade and technology are not necessarily competing explanations. For example,
Acemoglu (1999), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) and Thoenig and Verdier (2000) show
how trade liberalisation can induce skill-biased technological progress in models with
endogenous innovation. These models can be seen as formalising the arguments of Wood
(1994) that increased trade encourages labour-saving "defensive innovations". Second, we
should not focus only on North-South trade. There is some empirical evidence that changes
in North-North trade can have greater effects on wage inequality.
5 This is consistent with
theoretical work by Dinopoulos, Syropoulos and Xu (2000) and Ekholm and Midelfart
Knarvik (2000), who show how trade liberalisation in monopolistically competitive industries
can raise skill intensity either by inducing changes in firm scale or by encouraging a shift
from traditional to modern (i.e., skill-intensive) firms. Finally, all these papers too are
vulnerable to the Krugman critique. In the words of Leamer (2000), the "news" about
changes in foreign competition reaches Northern markets only via prices. But once we leave
the realm of competitive equilibrium, non-price competition and strategic interactions provide
a host of alternative channels whereby firms can interact without significant changes in trade
volumes. To explore these issues, we need a model of general oligopolistic equilibrium, or
"GOLE". Such a model has been a goal of theorists for decades but remains elusive. In the
next sections I turn from globalisation to theory in order to consider why this is so and what
can be done about it.
3. Pitfalls on the Road to General Oligopolistic Equilibrium
The problems of modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium can be simply stated.
6
5 See, for example, Greenaway, Hine and Wright (1999).
6 See Hart (1985) for a review and Neary (2003) for further references.
5We want firms to be large enough to influence the price of their output and smart enough to
behave strategically against their rivals. But then they should also take account of their
ability to affect their profits in other ways. To the extent that they can influence the factor
prices they face, they should exercise monopsony power. Moreover, to the extent that their
pricing decisions can influence national income and hence shift the demand function for their
output, a phenomenon sometimes called the "Ford effect", they should take this into account.
Matters are even more complicated when we consider what it is that firms are trying
to maximise. Unlike competitive firms, oligopolistic ones can affect the purchasing power
of their profits. Taken literally, this suggests that their behaviour should be affected by the
choice of numeraire, or, more generally, the normalisation rule for prices: a bizarre feature
of an economic model. Since Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), one response to this has been to
assume that firms maximise not profits but utility, or, as in Dierker and Grodal (1998),
shareholders’ real wealth. But this requires that each firm calculate the full general
equilibrium of the whole economy in making its decisions. Finally, even if firms merely
maximise profits and we ignore the numeraire problem, Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977)
have shown that profit functions may not be quasi-concave, in which case pure strategy
equilibria may not exist.
4. Large in the Small and Vice Versa
Given all the difficulties of modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium which I have
summarised, it is not surprising that the literature on the topic is tiny, especially compared
to the enormous literature on monopolistic competition in general equilibrium. Yet all these
difficulties stem from a single assumption: that firms are large in the economy as a whole.
This assumption does not even have the defense that it is very realistic. It may be true that
6many firms have some monopsony power, at least in local labour markets. But as a first step,
it seems reasonable to abstract from this. As for the Ford effect, it is hard to think of any
firms which could exercise such powers in modern diversified economies. Faced with a
central assumption which is both troublesome and unrealistic, it makes sense to drop it, which
leads to the key idea I want to explore.
Logically, if I want to assume that firms are large in their own sectors, but small in
the economy as a whole, then the sectors themselves must be small. The route to modelling
this is one that has already been widely used since it was introduced by Samuelson (1964):
a continuum of sectors, with economy-wide factor markets. Almost all previous authors have
assumed that each sector is either perfectly competitive, with implicitly its own continuum
of firms; or monopolised by a single firm whose output is an imperfect substitute for the
outputs of all other firms, so the whole group of sectors comprises a monopolistically
competitive industry. By contrast, I allow for a small number of firms in each sector, with
entry either impossible or restricted, and with perceived interdependence between firms
leading them to engage in strategic behaviour.
Taking this approach resolves all of the difficulties I outlined in the last section. If
firms are small in all markets other than their own, they take factor prices and national
income as fixed in making their decisions. So, they can neither exercise monopsony power
nor benefit from the Ford effect. As for profits, those of any one firm constitute a negligible
fraction of aggregate purchasing power, so the objective of maximising them is no more
objectionable than it is in competitive models. The fact that profits are actually earned in
equilibrium does not complicate matters, provided we assume they are costlessly redistributed
to a single aggregate consumer: a horrendous assumption, but not peculiar to this area.
Finally, though existence of equilibrium in general may be problematic, there is no reason to
7believe that it will be less likely than in comparable competitive models, provided the
requirements for existence in partial equilibrium are fulfilled.
I hope to convince you that this idea has promise in making possible a tractable but
theoretically consistent theory of oligopoly in general equilibrium. Of course, it has many
precursors. Viewing firms as small in the whole economy but possessing monopoly power
in their own market is the essence of the models of monopolistic competition in general
equilibrium which I have already discussed. So my approach owes a great deal to that of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and in particular to the clarification of its theoretical underpinnings
provided by d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1996). Models with more
than one firm per sector and some degree of strategic interaction have been explored by a
number of authors, including Hart (1982), Shleifer (1986), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
(1989) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). However, in the details of market structure and
in their specific applications these papers are very different from mine. Above all, they were
not primarily concerned with my objective of building a bridge between the theory of
industrial organisation and general equilibrium analysis. In the remainder of this paper I want
to sketch how this can be done.
5. Specifying Demand
As discussed in the previous section, the key conceptual step in my approach is to
view firms as large in their own sector but small in the economy as a whole. The key
technical step in implementing this approach is to find a tractable specification of preferences.
In principle any additively separable specification of preferences will do, since additive
separability implies what Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) call "Frisch demands": the
inverse demand for each good depends only on its own consumption and on the marginal
8utility of income. Assume a representative consumer with an additively separable utility
function defined over a continuum of goods:
Utility is maximised subject to the budget constraint:
(1)
where I is aggregate income. The first-order conditions give the inverse demand functions
(2)
for the output of each sector z:
where λ is the marginal utility of income, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget
(3)
constraint.
All this is well known, and has been used in a variety of fields. However, almost all
previous applications have in common that they use one or other device to get rid of λ . Thus
in stochastic consumption theory, where x(z) denotes the consumption in period z, the implicit
demands for two adjacent periods can be combined. Eliminating λ gives the Euler equation.
Alternatively, in the theory of industrial organisation (and its applications to trade and other
fields), specifications such as (1) are typically combined with a "numeraire" good to give
quasi-linear preferences: U=x 0 + ∫
1
0 u[x(z)]dz. The value of λ is then one, so (3) provides
a secure foundation for partial equilibrium analysis.
7
By contrast, I want to argue that, when λ is kept explicit, the demand functions in (3),
combined with the continuum assumption, make possible a consistent but tractable theory of
7 See, for example, Spence (1976), Vives (1985) and Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002).
9imperfect competition in general equilibrium. Previous attempts at developing such a theory
have worked either with "subjective" or "objective" demand curves: the former, as in Negishi
(1961), perceived by firms; the latter, as in Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) and Roberts and
Sonnenschein (1977), derived explicitly from utility maximisation. Equation (3) reconciles
these two approaches. On the one hand, bearing in mind that λ is endogenous, equation (3)
gives the objective demand functions directly. On the other hand, firms take λ as given, quite
rationally since their own infinitesimal scale makes them impotent to affect it. Hence (3)
with λ fixed also gives the subjective demand functions perceived by firms. The demand for
good z depends on variables outside sector z only through the marginal utility of income,
which therefore serves as a "sufficient statistic" for the rest of the economy in each sector.
While any additively separable utility function gives the "sufficient statistic" property,
the general sub-utility function, u[x(z)], is not tractable, not least because in general the
marginal utility of income cannot be written in closed form. Hence we need to consider some
special cases. Constant-elasticity-of-substitution or Dixit-Stiglitz preferences are an obvious
candidate, since they lead to iso-elastic perceived demand curves. Such preferences have
provided the foundation for the myriad applications of monopolistic competition. However,
in oligopoly models, iso-elastic demands are less convenient. For example, they imply that
outputs are often strategic complements in Cournot competition, and reaction functions are
not well-behaved. Hence I have chosen to work with a different specification of preferences.
Following Neary (2002d) therefore, consider the case where each sub-utility function
is quadratic:
Now the inverse demand functions and the marginal utility of income are:
(4)
10where µp is the mean of prices and σ
2
p is their (uncentred) variance. Hence, a rise in income,
(5)
a rise in the (uncentred) variance of prices, or a fall in the mean of prices, all reduce λ and
so shift the demand function for each good outwards. Firms, however, take λ as fixed, and
so the perceived or subjective inverse demand curves are linear, as in Negishi (1961).
Oligopoly models with linear demand functions are easy to solve in partial equilibrium, which
allows us to construct a tractable but consistent model of oligopoly in general equilibrium.
It might be objected that a linear demand system does not provide a very general
foundation for a model of general equilibrium. The point is well taken, but we have to start
somewhere, and I hope to show that this approach leads in interesting directions. It also has
other desirable properties. For example, as I show in Neary (2002c), the quadratic
specification in (1) and (4) is a special case of the Gorman polar form. (See Gorman (1961).)
Hence it aggregates perfectly over different countries, provided they have the same b
parameter.
6. Oligopoly in General Equilibrium
The specification of preferences discussed in the last section could be combined with
a wide range of assumptions about the supply side of the economy. I begin with a
particularly simple set-up. Let each of the infinite number of goods be produced by a small
number of firms. I assume the simplest form of oligopolistic interaction in each sector, one-
stage homogeneous-product Cournot competition with an exogenous number of firms. Since
the number of firms is exogenous for the present, little is lost by assuming for convenience
that it is the same in each sector. As for technology and factor markets, I assume the
11simplest Ricardian specification: labour is the only factor of production, returns to scale are
constant, and labour is used with different efficiency levels across sectors and countries.
Finally, all income (including profits and tariff revenue, if any) accrues to the aggregate
household and is spent on current consumption.
To discuss globalisation I need to consider at least two countries. However, it is
helpful to digress and, drawing on Neary (2003), to consider first the case of a single country.
This allows me to show how equilibria can be calculated in these models, and it also throws
an interesting light on competition policy in general equilibrium.
The first-order condition for a typical firm in sector z is: p(z)−c(z)=bλ
−1y(z), where
p(z), c(z) and y(z) denote the price, unit cost and output per firm in sector z respectively.
Eliminating p(z) from (5), setting demand x(z) equal to supply ny(z), we can solve for
equilibrium firm output:
The unit cost of production in each sector, c(z), equals the economy-wide wage rate, w, times
(6)
the sector’s labour requirement per unit output, denoted by α (z): c(z)=wα (z). The equilibrium
condition in the labour market requires that the exogenous labour supply L equal the total
demand for labour from all sectors:
Inspecting equations (6) and (7) shows that they are homogeneous of degree zero in two
(7)
12nominal variables, the wage rate w and the inverse of the marginal utility of income, λ
−1.
8
As is normal in real models, the absolute values of these variables are indeterminate, and,
indeed, uninteresting. Hence we can choose an arbitrary numeraire. (This will be a true
numeraire: unlike the cases discussed in Section 3, the choice of numeraire has no
implications for the model’s properties.) It is most convenient to choose utility itself as the
numeraire and set λ equal to one. Hence from now on nominal wages and all other nominal
variables are measured in utility units or "utils".
To solve the model, note that equations (6) and (7), with the definition of c(z),
combine to give a single equation in a single unknown, w. Solving this by evaluating the
integral in (7) gives:
where µ and σ
2 denote the first and second moments of the technology distribution:
(8)
Equation (8) implies that an increase in the number of firms in all sectors, a crude but simple
(9)
way of modelling competition policy, raises the wage. It can also be shown that profits fall,
so competition policy has the expected effects on income distribution.
However, it is more important to consider the effects of competition policy on welfare,
and this is possible in the present model since we have an explicit welfare criterion.
Substituting the direct demand functions from (5) into the direct utility function gives the
indirect utility function (ignoring a constant):
8 A standard implication of additive preferences is that demands are homogeneous of degree
zero in prices and λ
−1: see Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985). Here I have replaced the
infinite number of prices with the economy-wide wage w.
13So welfare is inversely related to the variance of the distribution of prices. This in turn can
(10)
be shown to equal:
9
where v
2 denotes the variance of the technology distribution: v
2 =σ
2−µ
2. Equation (11) is
(11)
decreasing in the number of firms, implying that competition policy raises welfare. Since
there are no other distortions in the model, we would expect this to be so. But notice one
surprising feature: welfare is strictly increasing in n only if v
2>0. When v
2 is zero, all sectors
have the same technology parameter, and equation (11) shows clearly that in this featureless
economy, competition policy has no effect on welfare: dU ˜/dn=0. Inducing entry by more
firms in all sectors raises the demand for labour. But since the aggregate labour supply
constraint is binding, this merely redistributes income from profits to wages without any gains
in efficiency.
This result should not be seen as an argument against activism in competition policy.
The model is far too stylised to provide a basis for policy-making. In the realistic case where
sectors are heterogeneous, the welfare costs of oligopoly implied by (11) may be greater than
those implied by partial equilibrium calculations in the tradition of Harberger (1954). Rather,
the result should be seen as an extreme case which brings out the importance of a general-
equilibrium perspective. It was clearly stated by Lerner (1933-34), who also conjectured that
a suitable measure of the economy-wide degree of monopoly is the standard deviation of the
"degrees of monopoly" (i.e., the price-cost margins) in all sectors. Equation (11) confirms
9 See Neary (2003) for details.
14Lerner’s intuition, and shows how it relates to the underlying structural parameters in the
economy.
7. Trade Liberalisation and Industrial Structure
Now, back to globalisation. From here on, I use mostly geometric tools of exposition,
and refer to my other papers for technical details and formal proofs.
10 In this section and
the next, I consider a two-country world in which each country is similar in structure to the
closed economy of the last section. Call the two countries "home" and "foreign", with
asterisks denoting foreign variables. All nominal variables are measured in utils, with the
world marginal utility of income set equal to unity by choice of units. I begin with the
determination of equilibrium in a single international oligopolistic industry. I assume that
there are no transport costs or other barriers to international trade, and that firms view the
world market as a fully integrated one. As before, the inverse demand function is given by
(5), with λ taken as fixed by firms. I assume a given number n of home firms, all of which
have the same marginal cost c, so all home firms have the same equilibrium output, denoted
by y. Similarly, there is a given number n
* of foreign firms, all with the same marginal cost
c
* and the same equilibrium output y
*. Total sales equal the sum of total production by home
and foreign firms: x = ny+n
*y
*.
To illustrate the implications for whether home firms produce positive levels of output,
consider Figure 1. This is drawn in the space of home and foreign marginal costs, c and c
*,
assuming given values of n and n
*. Suppose first that foreign firms do not produce. The
10 The model is introduced and applied to classic trade issues in Neary (2002d). Neary
(2002c) presents a geometric exposition, on which I draw in this section. Neary (2002e) and
(2002a) explore the implications for cross-border mergers and the effects of trade on income
inequality, respectively.
15output of a typical home firm is then given by the autarky expression (6). Hence, since
operating profits are proportional to output, home firms are profitable provided c is below
a.
11 Now suppose instead that all n
* foreign firms produce at a positive output level. The
output of a typical home firm is then:





a threshold locus, the upward-sloping line separating the F and HF regions in Figure 1.
Taken together, these two profitability constraints imply that home firms are profitable only
when c(z) lies below both this locus and a; i.e., in the regions labelled HF and H.
Combining these conditions with similar restrictions on the foreign firms, the possible
equilibria are as illustrated in Figure 1. If both home and foreign marginal costs exceed a,
in the O region, then no firms serve the market. Otherwise the market may be served by
firms from one or both countries, depending on the configuration of marginal costs.
Inspecting the diagram shows that the size of the HF region, in which both home and foreign
firms are viable, contracts as the number of firms in either country rises. In the competitive
limit, when both n and n
* approach infinity, the region collapses to the 45 line.
Next I want to extend this sectoral analysis to general equilibrium. Assume the same
Ricardian production structure as in the previous section, but now with international
differences in technology. Marginal costs in each sector thus depend on the labour input
coefficients α (z) and α
*(z), and on the wage rates in both countries, w and w
*:
11 From the firms’ first-order condition, p(z)−c(z)=by(z), operating profits, [p(z)−c(z)]y(z),
equal by(z)
2. In this section and the next I ignore fixed costs for simplicity.
16I assume that sectors can be ranked unambiguously such that the home country is more
(13)
efficient in producing goods with low values of z.
12 For given wage rates, the distribution
of costs in the two countries can therefore be illustrated by a locus such as the downward-
sloping line in Figure 2. In the case shown, there are two threshold sectors, z ˜ and z ˜
*. All
sectors for which z is less than z ˜ are competitive in the home country, while all sectors for
which z is greater than z ˜
* are competitive in the foreign country. Hence, home and foreign
firms coexist in sectors between z ˜
* and z ˜. It is also possible for one or both countries to
produce all goods, in which case either z ˜ equals one and/or z ˜
* equals zero. Formally these
threshold sectors are defined by two pairs of complementary slack inequalities:
13
(where the signs beneath the arguments denote the signs of the corresponding partial
(14)
derivatives). Finally, the model is closed by the requirements that the labour market must
clear in both countries. These can be written in shorthand form as follows (where the details
resemble equation (7), extended to allow for the fact that some sectors in each country face
competition from abroad and some do not):
12 Formally, the assumption needed is that y(z) is decreasing in z and that y
*(z) is increasing
in z. Sufficient conditions for this are that c(z) is increasing in z and that c
*(z) is decreasing
in z. It is convenient to draw the locus relating c(z) and c
*(z) as a straight line, but nothing
hinges on this. Further details are given in Neary (2002d).
13 The function y(z,w,w
*) is given by (12), with a corresponding expression for y
*(z,w
*,w).
17Combined with (14), these give four equations in the four unknowns w, w
*, z ˜ and z ˜
*.
(15)
In a competitive model, at most one sector can operate in both countries in
equilibrium, corresponding to the knife-edge case where c(z)=c
*(z). In oligopoly, by contrast,
high-cost firms are not necessarily driven out of business. Trade liberalisation thus wipes out
some sectors where high-cost firms could not compete. But firms which are less efficient
than foreign rivals can survive, which is not true in perfect competition.
8. Cross-Border Mergers
In this section I want to extend the model of the previous section to show how trade
liberalisation can lead to cross-border merger waves. This may seem like a strong claim,
since oligopoly theory has difficulty explaining why firms engaged in Cournot competition
would want to merge, in the absence of cost savings. What is sometimes called the "Cournot
merger paradox" is due to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), who showed that mergers
between symmetric firms are unprofitable unless the merged firms produce a very high
proportion of pre-merger industry output: over 80% when demand is linear. Subsequent work
has shown that mergers may be profitable if Cournot competition is extended in various ways,
such as allowing cost synergies, owner-manager delegation, or union wage bargaining. It has
also shown that the opposite problem, of too many mergers rather than too few, holds in
Bertrand competition.
14 However, it has not overturned the original Salant-Switzer-Reynolds
result.
14 From a large literature, see Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Faulí-Oller (1997), Horn and
Persson (2001), Lommerud and So /rgard (1997) and Perry and Porter (1985).
18The key to the prediction of mergers in my framework is not general equilibrium per
se, but rather cost differences between firms. The two go together, since in partial
equilibrium there is usually no plausible basis for assuming firm heterogeneity. By contrast,
in a two-country context, international differences in technology provide a natural reason for
it. It turns out that such differences generate incentives for bilateral mergers; more
specifically, they generate incentives for takeovers, since mergers are profitable only in one
direction: namely, when a low-cost firm acquires a high-cost one.
To see this, return to the model of the last section, and ask what are the incentives for
a foreign firm to acquire a home one. The gain from such a transaction is the increase in
operating profits for the foreign firm, less the cost of acquiring the home one, which I assume
equals its initial profits. Using subscripts "0" and "1" to denote the pre- and post-takeover
situations respectively, the gain is:
where the second line follows from footnote 11 (with b set equal to unity for convenience).
(16)
Assume for the present that wages can be taken as exogenous. (Of course, this is always true
for an individual firm contemplating a takeover. If many takeovers take place, then wages
will be affected in general equilibrium. I defer consideration of this.)
Equation (16) suggests that a takeover will not be profitable if the two participating
firms have the same costs, and hence the same initial outputs: the profits of the acquiring firm
(and of all firms like it) would have to double. I show in Neary (2002e) that this is indeed
the case, but that there is a range of costs within which the gain is strictly positive. The
reason for this is that outputs are strategic substitutes in Cournot competition, at least when
19demands are linear. (See Gaudet and Salant (1991) for further discussion.) Hence, a takeover
which closes down one firm raises operating profits for all surviving firms (including the
acquiring firm). Provided the cost differential is sufficiently great, a low-cost foreign firm
can afford to acquire a high-cost home one. The region within which this is possible is
indicated in Figure 3. Within it, high-cost home firms can earn positive profits, but are
vulnerable to a bilateral takeover by low-cost foreign rivals. An exactly symmetric argument
shows that there is a similar region in Figure 3 in which high-cost foreign firms can earn
positive profits, but are vulnerable to a bilateral takeover by low-cost home rivals.
Next, staying in partial equilibrium for the present, we can ask what will be the effect
of such a bilateral takeover on the incentives for further takeovers in the same industry.
Because all outputs are strategic substitutes, the outputs, and hence the profits, of all surviving
firms, both home and foreign, increase. Moreover, with linear demands, the outputs of all
surviving firms rise by the same amount. But the low-cost foreign firms have larger output
to begin with. Hence, since profits are proportional to the square of output, a further takeover
increases their profits by more. Formally, as I show in Neary (2002e), GFH is decreasing in
n: so, a fall in n as a result of a takeover raises the incentive for a further takeover. This is
the basis for the prediction of merger waves. A profitable takeover of one home firm by a
foreign firm increases the gain to a takeover of one of the remaining home firms by a foreign
firm in the same sector.
So far, I have been careful to talk only about incentives for mergers. While it is
plausible to conclude that an increase in GFH will raise the probability of a takeover, a
positive but small value of GFH does not by itself guarantee that a takeover will take place.
In the real world there are many reasons why takeovers which promise small net gains may
not take place: transactions costs, uncertainty, not to mention managerial hubris. In the model
20there is a further consideration: as is well known, profitable mergers which do not yield cost
savings exhibit an "after-you" syndrome. From a group of identical large firms, all face the




0, without having to
incur the cost of acquiring the target firm, π 0. Hence no one firm may opt to engage in a
takeover, since this would confer even greater benefits on its otherwise identical rivals.
However, to explore the general equilibrium repercussions, I need to be specific about
which takeovers will occur. So let me cast caution to the winds and make the very simple
assumption that all ex post profitable bilateral takeovers will take place. I thus ignore the
"after-you" problem. I also assume that only bilateral takeovers will occur. In the HF region
in Figure 3, bilateral mergers would be profitable if there were fewer high-cost firms, i.e., if
some bilateral mergers had already taken place. But with the initial number of high-cost
firms, the first bilateral takeover is not profitable, and so the merger wave is not initiated.
Putting this differently, merger waves take place at the intensive but not at the extensive
margin. Finally, my assumption is that only ex post profitable takeovers will take place. This
implies that firms anticipate the wage changes which the economy-wide takeovers will induce.
So, the final step is to solve for the change in wages.
To simplify matters, I concentrate on the case, illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, of
symmetric countries. Hence, in some sectors, high-cost firms in the home country are bought
out by low-cost foreign rivals, while in other sectors the converse happens. In both countries
there are expanding and contracting sectors. However, at the initial wages, expanding firms
grow by only a fraction of the outputs of the firms which are taken over.
15 Aggregating
over all sectors, the total demand for labour contracts in both countries. Assuming labour





*). See Neary (2002e) for details.
21markets are perfectly flexible, wages are bid down, which raises the profitability of marginal
high-cost firms, putting them out of reach of takeovers. As illustrated in Figure 4, the cost
locus shifts down, and so the general-equilibrium repercussions working through labour
markets dampen, though they cannot reverse, the tendency towards merger waves.
In summary, at least in the case of symmetric countries, cross-border mergers serve
as "instruments of comparative advantage" in both the positive and normative senses. They
facilitate more specialisation in the direction of comparative advantage, so restoring the trade
pattern to something closer to what would prevail in a competitive Ricardian world. And, by
putting downward pressure on wages, they reduce the variance of prices and so increase the
gains from trade in both countries. All this despite the fact that the sectors in which mergers
occur become less competitive, and the distribution of income tilts towards profits at the
expense of wages in both countries.
9. Competitive Pressures and Wage Inequality
The model of the last section predicted that merger waves induced by trade
liberalisation would shift the distribution of income in favour of profits at the expense of
wages. However, most discussions of the effects of globalisation on income distribution have
focused on a different margin, that between skilled and unskilled wages. Here I present a
variant of the model of the last section which suggests some novel perspectives on this issue.
I retain many of the features already introduced: demands are linear from the
perspective of firms, which is rationalised in general equilibrium by continuum-quadratic
preferences; and firms in each sector play a two-stage game, with Cournot competition at the
second stage. One major difference is that the decision at the first stage is not whether to
engage in a takeover but how much to invest, where the return to investment comes in the
22form of reduced marginal production costs. Second, I now allow for two types of labour,
skilled and unskilled, with variable aggregate supplies. As in the papers mentioned in Section
2, I assume that investment requires only skilled labour and production requires only
unskilled. Third, I assume that national markets are segmented, and that firms must pay a
per-unit premium t on each unit sold in their foreign market, which can represent either tariffs
or transport costs. Finally, I simplify in a number of respects: I abstract from inter-sectoral
differences; I assume that home and foreign firms have access to the same technology; I
assume that the two countries are identical, since I want to focus on the effects of North-
North trade; and I assume only one home and one foreign firm in each sector, with
investment and output decisions for both markets taken separately.
Consider first the equilibrium in a single sector in the home country. The profits of
a typical home firm in its home market (suppressing the sectoral index z for convenience) are:
where r and s denote the wage and the employment level of skilled labour, respectively. The
(17)
firm’s unskilled labour requirement is proportional to output as in previous sections. The new
feature is that the factor of proportionality can be reduced by prior investment, which in turn
requires skilled labour. Assuming quadratic costs of investment, the firm’s technology is:
In partial equilibrium it is convenient to treat investment and output as the firm’s decision
(18)
variables, so rewrite profits as:
A similar expression applies to the foreign firm’s profits on its sales in the home market:
(19)
23The foreign firm faces a sales cost t per unit; but, since the two countries are identical, it pays
(20)
the same factor prices as the home firm.
Since I am interested in responses to changes in the external environment, it is natural
to consider a simultaneous-move game, unlike the literature on entry-deterrence, where it is
natural to assume that the home firm has a first-mover advantage. In a sub-game perfect
equilibrium with both firms active, each firm has an incentive to behave strategically, over-
investing (relative to the cost-minimising level) in order to reduce its rival’s output.
16 The
first-order condition for investment by the home firm is:
where ω is the ratio of unskilled to skilled wages, w/r. Equation (21) shows that the level
(21)
of investment is directly related to output by three parameters, representing strategic
behaviour, technology, and factor prices respectively. The strategic parameter µ equals one
when the firm does not behave strategically and 4/3 when it does. Combining (21) with the
home firm’s first-order condition for output, we can derive two reaction functions in output
space, one assuming that the firm invests strategically and the other that it does not. They
are illustrated in Figure 5 by the lines MH′ and HH′ respectively. (Only sub-game perfect
two-stage Nash equilibria are considered, but the "non-strategic" reaction function is a useful
expository device. All this is justified in the Appendix, drawing on Neary (2002a)).
To see the implications for trade liberalisation, consider a sequence of two-stage games
with progressively lower values of the access cost t facing the foreign firm. Start with the
case where t is initially too high to enable it to serve the home market: in Figure 5, its
16 See for example, Spencer and Brander (1983) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
24reaction function in output space is shown as FF′ . The home firm is thus an unconstrained
monopolist and has no need to engage in strategic investment. Its non-strategic reaction
function is shown as MH′ (with µ equal to one), and equilibrium monopoly output is given
by point M.
Now, suppose that a fall in t allows the foreign firm to compete at lower cost in the
home market. Its reaction function shifts rightwards, as indicated by the horizontal arrow.
If it shifts far enough that point F lies above point M, then the home firm has an incentive
to invest strategically. Provided foreign costs do not fall far enough to shift the foreign firm’s
reaction function beyond the point H, the foreign firm does not invest in equilibrium while
the home firm invests just enough that the foreign firm’s equilibrium output is zero. Suppose,
however, that t falls even further, so that the foreign reaction function lies outside HH′ , the
home firm’s reaction function when it invests strategically in a duopoly. Now, the home firm
no longer finds it profitable to prevent entry. Imports then occur, and the equilibrium is a
duopoly with positive levels of strategic investment by both firms. In Figure 5, the locus of
equilibria as trade costs fall is indicated by a thick line. The most interesting feature of this
model is that, for foreign cost levels which lead the foreign firm’s reaction function to meet
the y axis in the range MH, entry is prevented, and no imports occur, even though the threat
of imports encourages the home firm to produce with a higher ratio of investment to output.
It is easy to see the general equilibrium implications of this. From (18), each firm’s
demand for skilled labour increases with its investment. The demand for unskilled labour
may rise or fall, depending on whether the substitution or output effect dominates. However,
the relative demand for skilled labour must rise. Since this happens in all import-competing
firms throughout the economy, it feeds back onto factor markets. If aggregate factor supplies
are fixed, as in Section 6, then all the adjustment is borne by factor prices. It is more
25plausible to assume that the relative supply of skilled labour is increasing in the skill
premium, r/w. This may reflect a trade-off between work and leisure or the steady state of
a dynamic process of skill acquisition as in Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (1999). In either case, the higher relative demand for skilled labour leads to
a rise in the economy-wide skill premium, which in turn induces an increase in the relative
supply of skilled labour. This supply response dampens the increase in relative factor
demands, but (assuming that factor markets are stable) cannot eliminate it. So skill premia
and skill intensities rise throughout the economy. All these predictions accord with the
stylised facts presented in the introduction.
The details of this simple model are not to be taken too seriously.
17 But even as it
stands, it suggests a number of lessons for the trade and wages debate which competitive
models cannot capture. It clearly meets the Krugman critique: in the extreme case I
considered, the threat of foreign competition is sufficient to lead incumbent firms to engage
in strategic investment which raises the relative demand for skilled labour even though no
imports actually occur. It also suggests that the effects of increases in North-North trade can
be just as important as those of the quantitatively less significant North-South trade. Finally,
it shows that the dichotomy between trade and technology as competing explanations for the
change in relative skill demands is misplaced. Not only is the change in technology induced
by changes in trade barriers in this model. In addition, exogenous technical progress which
took the neutral form of a reduction in the α 0 parameter in (18) would have exactly the same
effects as those of the fall in tariffs I have considered. Hence, at least as far as resource
17 Though the conclusions are robust to the assumptions about firm behaviour. I have shown
in Neary (2002a) that, perhaps surprisingly, the strategic effect is also increasing in the
number of firms if competition is Bertrand rather than Cournot, provided there is more than
one home firm and products are differentiated but not too much so.
26allocation is concerned, trade and technology shocks are observationally equivalent in the
present model. This clearly poses headaches for empirical work. It also throws in a new
light the findings from some empirical studies that the effect of trade on wages is greater in
more concentrated industries. (See Borjas and Ramey (1995), Oliveira-Martins (1994) and
Sachs and Shatz (1994).) But perhaps a broader lesson is that it is not trade as such but
increased competition (actual or potential) which can lead firms to make defensive
investments which raise their relative demand for skilled labour.
10. Conclusion
In this paper I have claimed that we need to think about the economy-wide and world-
wide problems of globalisation using economy-wide and world-wide tools, by which I mean
the tools of general equilibrium analysis. I have argued that some of these problems are
poorly explained by general equilibrium models which assume a market structure that is
competitive, whether perfect or monopolistic. More positively, I have suggested an approach
which may break the log-jam that has held back progress in grafting oligopoly onto general
equilibrium for so long. I have drawn on recent research to sketch a model which allows a
consistent yet tractable treatment of oligopoly in general equilibrium, and have explored its
implications for the effects of trade liberalisation on specialisation patterns, on cross-border
merger waves, and on wage inequality.
Anti-globalisation protestors would no doubt be dismissive of a paper whose main
theme could be summarised (unfairly, I hope!) by the proposal to replace constant-elasticity
by linear demand functions in trade theory. However, they might be more sympathetic if I
summarise the central message instead as a plea for incorporating real firms into general
equilibrium analysis. There are many dimensions to "real firms" of course. Increasing
27returns and product differentiation have been successfully incorporated into general
equilibrium in the voluminous literature on monopolistic competition initiated by Dixit and
Norman (1980), Ethier (1982) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).
18 General-equilibrium
implications of the internal organisation of firms have recently been explored by Grossman
and Helpman (2002), Marin and Verdier (2001) and McLaren (2000). Finally, the new micro-
econometrics of trade has uncovered some intriguing stylised facts - for example, surprisingly
few firms engage in exporting, and those that do tend to be larger than average.
19 However,
all these exciting developments have so far drawn little on models of industrial organisation,
where incumbent firms engage in strategic and typically multi-stage behaviour, and where
entry of new firms is partly or fully restricted. I believe there is a huge pay-off to integrating
this literature with general equilibrium theory, and the benefits may flow both ways, as I have
suggested in my proposed resolution of the Cournot merger paradox. While the simple
models I have presented here are only a first step, I hope I have persuaded at least some of
you that the approach sketched in this paper is a promising route to this integration, which
is badly needed if we are to increase our understanding of the real-world problems of
globalisation.
18 I discuss further the relationship between this literature and my approach here in Neary
(2001, 2002b).
19 See Bernard et al. (2000) and Melitz (2002).
28Appendix to Section 9
When the home firm faces no competition, actual or potential, from the foreign firm,
it chooses investment to minimise total costs, and produces the monopoly level of output.
Its first-order conditions are:
where A≡ a−wα 0 is a measure of the cost competitiveness of the home firm. Solving for the
(22)
monopoly levels of investment and output:
where, as in Leahy and Neary (1997), η≡ (θ w)
2/(br) can be interpreted as the relative
(23)
efficiency of investment. The monopoly output level yM is at point M in Figure 5.
When the home firm faces competition from the foreign firm, we need to calculate
both boundary and interior equilibria of the two-firm game. In the second stage, the first-
order conditions for output, and the implied output reaction functions, are:
where A
*≡ a−t−wα 0, the foreign firm’s cost competitiveness. In the first stage of an interior
(24)
equilibrium, each firm chooses its investment taking account of the strategic effect it will
have on its rival’s output in the second stage. Thus, the home firm’s first-order condition is:
Calculating these terms explicitly, and repeating for the foreign firm, the first-order conditions
(25)
29for investment and the implied investment reaction functions (using the solution from (24) to
eliminate outputs) are:
The determinant of the coefficient matrix in (26) equals 3∆ , where ∆ is defined as
(26)
(1−µη )(3−µη ) and must be positive for stability.
Consider first the foreign firm’s best response to the home firm’s monopoly level of
output. Substituting for kM from (23) into the foreign firm’s reaction function in (26), and
setting k
* equal to zero yields:
So this is the threshold level of foreign competitiveness at which the foreign firm chooses not
(27)
to invest when the home firm chooses the monopoly level of investment.
Next, consider an interior equilibrium. Solving (26) for the equilibrium levels of home
and foreign investment:
Hence, setting k
* to zero, the threshold level of A
* at which the foreign firm chooses not to
(28)
invest (corresponding to point H in Figure 5) is:
When the foreign firm has this level of competitiveness, the level of home investment is:
(29)
30This is clearly greater than the monopoly level given by (23).
(30)
Finally, for values of A
* between those given in (27) and (29), what is the home firm’s
best response to a zero level of investment by the foreign firm? Inspecting the matrix
equation in (24) when k
* is zero, it is clear that the home firm’s output and profits are higher
when the foreign firm’s output is zero. Hence the home firm maximises profits by choosing
its investment not according to the first-order condition (25) but at a level that sets foreign
output to zero. From the foreign firm’s reaction function (the second row of the matrix
equation in (24)), with k
* equal to zero, this implies:
Thus the optimal level of home investment increases linearly in A
* (i.e., falls linearly in t)
(31)
within the relevant range. Substituting y
*=0 and k from (31) into the home reaction function
in (24), the home firm’s output level in this range is A
*/b, which is the intercept of the foreign
firm’s reaction function on the y axis in Figure 5. This confirms that the level of home
investment which is the best response to zero foreign investment in the first stage is just
sufficient to set foreign output to zero in the second stage.
As for the "output reaction functions" in Figure 5, these represent the second-stage
reaction functions from (24) with k and k
* eliminated using the first-order conditions in (26).
Setting µ equal to 4/3 gives the loci HH′ and FF′ , while setting µ equal to one gives the locus
MH′ . Each of these pseudo-reaction functions depends only on the competitiveness parameter
of the firm in question, unlike the investment reaction functions in (26), which is why it is
easier to illustrate equilibrium in output than in investment space.
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Figure 4:  Wage Adjustments Dampen






Figure 5:  Equilibrium Sales in Home Market
as Import Barriers Fall
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